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"...if anyone makes the assistance of grace depend on the humility or obedience of man and does not agree that it is a gift of grace itself that we are obedient and humble, he contradicts the Apostle who says, "What have you that you did not receive?" (1 Cor. 4:7), and, "But by the grace of God I am what I am" (1 Cor. 15:10). (Council of Orange: Canon 6)

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    We are a community of confessing believers who love the gospel of Jesus Christ, affirm the Biblical and Christ-exalting truths of the Reformation such as the five solas, the doctrines of grace, monergistic regeneration, and the redemptive historical approach to interpreting the Scriptures.

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  • « Regeneration by Charles Hodge | Main | Predestination by A.A. Hodge »

    Free Will and Moral Responsibility by John Frame

    About ten years ago I interviewed John Frame. I was just starting to become familiar with his work and I am so glad I was introduced to him. John Frame is one of the clearest, precise, and critical thinkers of our time. John Frame is so committed to the authority of scripture he will uphold this over any confession written by man. I truly appreciate this about John Frame. He is not simply a man who try's to uphold a confession, but scripture. The following is an article he wrote about Free Will and Moral responsibility.


    I highly recommend his Systematic Theology which is the magnum opus of his life work.

    There are two theories of free will that are often discussed in relation to ethical responsibility. The first is usually called “libertarianism,” and it is typical of Arminian theology. Many philosophers have also argued for it, from Epicurus in ancient times to C. A. Campbell, H. D. Lewis, Alvin Plantinga and many others recently. Indeed, it seems to be something of a consensus among Christian philosophers today that one cannot do justice to moral responsibility without presupposing a libertarian view of freedom.

    The libertarian view states that some human decisions and actions, particularly moral and religious decisions, are strictly uncaused. In the most sophisticated forms of libertarianism, these decisions are not even caused by our desires or character. They are very insistent on this: a truly free act is not an act which carries out our strongest desire; it rather, typically, goes against our strongest desire. The libertarian is aware, of course, that our desires are largely a function of our heredity, environment, past decisions and so on. If free decisions are based on desires, he thinks, they are not fully free. They are not in this case wholly uncaused.

    The libertarian argues that such a view is essential to moral responsibility. For no one is responsible for an act unless he “could have done otherwise.” If I am strapped to a robotic machine which, using my arms, robs a bank, I am not to blame for robbing the bank. I “could not have done otherwise.” Such is the libertarian argument.

    I have always felt that this position lacked cogency. For one thing, it denies the rule of God’s sovereignty over the hearts and decisions of human beings, a rule which I find abundantly attested in Scripture (see my lectures on the Doctrine of God). Indeed, in saying that human actions can be “uncaused,” it attributes to man ultimate causality; but in Christianity, only God is the first cause.

    For another thing, libertarianism seems to me to be unintelligible on its own terms, for it makes our moral choices accidental. R. E. Hobart, in a famous article from the 1930s, wrote to the effect that on the libertarian basis, a moral choice is like my feet popping out of my bed without my desiring them to, and carrying me where I don’t want to go. The attempt to separate decisions from desires is psychologically perverse.

    Further, libertarianism, rather than guaranteeing moral responsibility, actually destroys it. How can we be held responsible for decisions, if those decisions are “psychological accidents,” unconnected with any of our desires? Indeed, such a situation would, precisely, negate all responsibility. Certainly it is difficult to imagine being held responsible for something we really didn’t want to do.

    Continue here

    Posted by Marco on March 5, 2014 11:29 AM

    Comments

    I checked the sections referring to the theory of the ”Original Sin” in the Frame’s Systematic Theology.

    Unfortunately, I was not able to find there any definitive explanation of the concept of “imputation” and what it really means that “all sinned in Adam.” There is a redirection to the John Murray book on imputation, but unfortunately this material is not available.

    And it seems that “imputation” is the core issue here, because if you prove logically and without contradictions that “we all sinned in Adam,” the problem of explaining away the logical tension between men’s total depravity and resulting inability to make a choice for God as well as theological need to attach personal guilt to this choice (to make damnation just) disappears.

    Simply, if we can establish that all sinned in Adam, it takes the problem of “the necessity to repeat the actual individual choice against God in this life (i.e. between human birth and death on earth)” redundant.

    If we in fact did sinned in Adam, we are not just sharing the consequences – including the resulting individual guilt, for which God has no mandate or stipulation not to punish us.

    Again, if we all sinned in Adam,” meaning in some mysterious way this choice was also actually and individually and effectively ours (I am not thinking here about the clever idea of so called representation, which is just a re-frame of the problem and redirection to the other perspective rather than resolving anything) the matter resolves itself.

    Please consider that if we actually made choice in Adam, there is no need to find ways to apportion individual guilt based on the willed or un-willed events in the current life. We would come on earth with this guilt already and we do not have to juggle concepts like inherited sinful nature used to apportion guilt to us in some robotic way (inheritance-like, as if guilt could be inherited as genetic illness).

    If we all sinned in Adam, the arguments against ethical aspects of apportioning the guilt of the other disappear. Also, the need for linguistic games around “free will” as a way to defend the “justness” of apportioning guilt linked to the responsibility for the “impossible” choice for God disappear.

    Thus Ro 5:12 is clear and useful: we all sinned in Adam, and that’s it. The concept of the So called “freedom” exercised during life on earth is redundant as a guild and justness of election or reprobation are concerned. If somebody is ashamed of the Gospel, and tries to soften the message or justify God, he actually goes against Him.

    Thanks for reading.

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